This chapter responds to an invitation from the Handbook editors, Aks Zaheer and Reinhard Bachmann. More specifically, we were asked to reflect on our companion papers dealing with the structuring and developmental processes of cooperative interorganizational relationships (Ring and . We summarize the prominent role that reliance on trust played in our initial framework, review the subsequent literature that has cited our papers, and then propose an agenda for research and policy that is undertaken to advance the scholarship and practice of relying on trust in managing cooperative inter-organizational relationships.
Introduction
Slightly over twenty years ago with approximately 35 colleagues, we began a multi-year research collaboration into the dynamics of innovation. 1 It became known as the Minnesota Innovation Research Program (MIRP), coordinated by the Strategic Management Research Center of the University of Minnesota. Among the five critical concepts that helped guide our collective research efforts was the notion of transactions. We had come to see this concept as central to the innovation process because our review of several extant literatures revealed that innovation frequently was a product of interorganizational collaborations, and the transactions that they produced. In addition, discussions with executives, managers, engineers and bench scientists at firms reputed to be among the leaders in the United States in fostering climates conducive to innovation led us to conclude that a study of the processes associated with innovation would require an investigation of the dynamics of collaborative efforts between groups of individuals and the firms, governmental agencies and non-governmental agencies that employed those individuals.
An explicit focus on the concept of trust did not surface in early discussions among MIRP investigators on what aspects of innovation to study. But as Ring and Rands (1989) moved more deeply into their study of the collaboration between 3M and NASA to employ the space shuttle as a vehicle for studying the effects of near zero gravity on a variety of experiments, it became apparent that reliance on trust was an underlying theme in the dealings between the various actors within the two organizations and in their interactions with each other (see, e.g., Ring 1996) . And as the findings of the various research teams became more evident to the larger group of researchers who made up MIRP, it also became increasingly clear that what Ring and Rands were observing at 3M and NASA was not an idiosyncratic artifact of that collaboration.
As a consequence of our backgrounds and research interests, we undertook a synthesis of the findings of previous studies as they related to transactions (Ring and Van de Ven 1989) . 2 As we were winding down our MIRP longitudinal field studies, we began to address the need to further refine our views on transaction governance and processes and take them before the larger academic community.
Our first effort, which involved a synthesis of the interactions between governance structures and transaction processes, met resistance from reviewers. Taking their guidance to heart, we began the development of two papers rather than our initial integrated effort. One dealt with governance. A second dealt with process. The fruits of our collaboration appeared first in the Strategic Management Journal and two years later in the Academy of Management Review (Ring and Van de Ven 1994) . By then the roles of trust in inter-organizational exchanges were becoming clearer to us and those views, although still in formative stages, were put forth in propositional terms.
Our view then and now is that there are contexts that give rise to compelling reasons to rely on trust in dealing with other people and institutions. We broadly defined trust as confidence in the goodwill of others not to cause harm to you when you are vulnerable to them . Like honesty, integrity, and competence, we viewed trust as a deeply shared value and that reliance on it would frequently flow when the former two also were present in a relationship. We viewed trust both as a glue that bonded a wide variety of relationships and as essential to the basic fabric of many societies. 3 Thus, many individuals rely on trust in dealing with institutions, organizations, strangers, and friends in varying degrees and for different things. An ability to rely on trust also provides security and meaning to our relationships. It permits us to get on with day-to-day life without having to inspect and monitor all the uncertainties and inexplicable situations that we cannot control, but to which we are vulnerable.
Several trends are motivating a growing appreciation of the importance of trust in social and economic relationships. First, with the growth of relational contracting 4 , outsourcing, strategic alliances, and networks, trust-based relationships are increasingly becoming an important organizing principle for doing business . Second, in an increasingly global economy, the parties engaged in many business relationships are from cultures that rely on different bases of personal and institutional trust (Pearce 2001) . Third, despite the immense appeal and importance of trust (Putnam 2002; , there also is extensive evidence that trust is declining in many societies and organizations (Bruhn 2001 ).
These trends represent significant opportunities to advance our understanding of the diverse roles that reliance on trust can assume in modern economies and in the governance of economic exchanges. 5 They motivate a reexamination of some ideas about trust that we wrote about over a decade ago in two companion papers on the structures and processes of cooperative relationships between organizations . 6 This chapter reflects on those papers and subsequent work on trust. First, we summarize our initial views of trust, and discuss subsequent developments in the concept of trust, the contexts and contingencies surrounding the emergence of reliance on trust, and the consequences or performance outcomes associated with trust. We also look at empirical studies of trust that have been undertaken over the past decade and the implications of their findings for subsequent developments in scholarship on trust.
We then examine the evolution of trust in society. Social and technical change is producing more temporary, mobile, and impersonal relationships (both between organizations and individuals associated with them). These trends threaten to undermine fragile long-term relationships based on interpersonal trust. One implication is that there seems to be greater reliance on institutional trust where one relies on the security of rules, structures, and organizations to buttress interpersonal trust. Another implication is that trust is often easier to breach than it is to build. No relationship is perfect, and most relationships are not expendable. As a result, seldom can parties terminate a relationship in the event a breach in trust occurs (as the literature implies). How can relationships continue when violations occur? We conclude by suggesting that an important research agenda is to examine forgiveness, repair, and reconstruction of trust in relationships that have experienced a breach in trust among the parties.
The Concept of Trust and its Evolution.
When preparing our original articles, we concluded that the extant literature in the late 1980s offered two broad definitions of trust. The first reflected confidence or predictability in one's expectations. This definition takes a cognitive, information uncertainty, and risk-based view of trust. The second (that we adopted) defined trust as faith in the goodwill of others not to harm your interests when you are vulnerable to them. To our knowledge, this faith-based view of trust was novel to the management literature at the time. Our use of it "legitimated" the concept among management scholars and opened up the way for a variety of other conceptual and empirical treatments of trust in the management literature.
Oliver and Ebers (1998) reviewed 198 articles that dealt with what we describe as cooperative Inter-Organizational Relationships (IORs) 7 , and proposed that four basic research perspectives were at work: social network, power and control, institutional, and transactions cost economics (TCE). They concluded that trust played important but different roles in these perspectives.
TCE and social exchange theories were often compared as conflicting or complementary theories. Here trust has been viewed as promoting flexibility while hierarchical governance structures inhibit flexibility. Young-Ybarra and Wiersema (1999) obtained empirical support for this conclusion. They found that economic constraints from TCE were positively related to trust, while dependence was negatively related to trust.
We argued that the implications of trusting behavior, generally, had been ignored by TCE. While not the first to make the case, we were the first to offer a model that suggested how trust might matter in the context of the governance choices available to managers of IORs. This point was taken up and has been built upon consistently since then. For example, Mollering (2002) examined six perspectives on trust and IORs. Based on a study of 184 UK printing IORs, the TCE based-argument was dismissed, while Bradach and Eccles' (1989) triadic forces of price, authority, and trust received strong support.
Although assessments of the role of trust were being discussed in economics and philosophy (Baier 1986) , our initial views of the concept of trust as goodwill were largely drawn from sociology. We relied on Dore's (1983) and Granovetter's (1985) formulations. Although we did not know it at the time, Dore's student--Mari Sako (1992)--was completing a doctoral study of British and Japanese inter-firm relationships in which trust played a central role. She too relied on goodwill trust, and introduced the complementary concepts of contract and competence-based trust.
In our initial discussions of trust we also observed that other researchers took a more risk or control oriented view of trust, arguing that trust decreases risk (see, e.g., Arrow 1973; Fried 1982; Shapiro 1987; Williamson 1985; Zucker 1986) . That view persists and is supported by empirical findings. For example, the more partners learn about each other, the more the uncertainties associated with their dealings decrease (Hyder and Ghauri 2000) .
Our approach to trust implied that it could be fruitfully viewed as a multidimensional concept. But we said little beyond offering the competing goodwill and risk/control oriented perspectives on the definition of trust. Nor can we pretend that we had exhaustively reviewed the literature on trust. For example, we "missed" the excellent collection on trust by Diego Gambetta (1988) , the analysis by Bradach and Eccles (1989) exploring the triadic forces of price, authority, and trust, and the important contributions of Butler (1991) and Larson (1992) .
Others have since provided a rich body of conceptual discussions of the meaning of trust. Barney and Hansen (1994) classified types of trustworthiness into weak, semistrong, and strong forms. Our colleagues at Minnesota, Bromiley and Cummings (1995) undertook an extensive study of the properties of trust and developed a comprehensive instrument. McAllister (1995) explored distinctions between affect and cognitive-based trust. Hwang and Burgers (1997) derived several properties of trust, and demonstrated that trust supported cooperation through its impact on two main threats to cooperation, namely fear and greed. Ring (1997a) explored the roles of fragile and resilient interpersonal trust in inter-organizational relationships. Sheppard and Sherman (1998) examined four distinct forms of trust: shallow dependence, shallow interdependence, deep dependence, and deep interdependence between parties. Further psychometric analysis found sixteen subconstructs of trust (McKnight, Choudhury, and Kacmar 2002) . Boersma, Buckley, and Ghauri (2003) suggested that trust can be operationalized as competence-based trust and promissory-based trust. Trust has also been viewed as a form of social capital Harvey, Noviecevic, Hench, and Myers 2003; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998) .
In sum, a significant body of scholarship on trust and its meaning in individual, organization and inter-organizational contexts has emerged in the past decade. In part this was stimulated by a series of special issues on trust in leading journals (e.g., Academy of Management Journal, 1997; Academy of Management Review, 1998; Organizational Studies, 2001; Organization Science, 2002 ) and a number of edited volumes and research monographs focused on the topic (e.g., Kramer and Tyler 1996; Misztal 1996; Lane and Bachmann 1998; Noteboom 2002) What can we make of this literature defining trust? Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer (1998) point out that in their assessment of the trust literature although there is no single definition of trust, its composite elements (willingness to accept vulnerability, positive expectations regarding the intentions or actions of others) are found in most. These elements are entirely consistent with the approach that we followed in formulating our own initial views on trust. But, we have found that subsequent operationalizations of the concept of trust have differed widely depending upon the disciplinary base of the researcher and the unit or level of analysis underlying the research being conducted. What is somewhat remarkable about these operational definitions is how few have been developed by setting out to rigorously investigate how a variety of economic actors actually employ the concept of trust in their daily conversations and actions, using these empirical results as the basis for instrument development. Butler (1991) and Bromiley and Cummings (1995) provide clear exceptions to this conclusion; yet their approaches are somewhat less relied upon than earlier formulations based in psychology designed to deal with a variety of interpersonal dynamics (not necessarily relevant to business contexts).
In our initial discussion of trust, we were concerned about its roles in governing economic exchanges between organizations. Consequently, we also explored its relationship to risk. Our definition of trust assumed vulnerability (a situation in which the risk of harm actually being done is present), so we were concerned also with what kinds of risks might be associated with economic exchanges that might lead to reliance on trust as a compliment to, or substitute for, other forms of governance.
We assumed that risk and trust were concepts that the parties could think of separately, particularly in making decisions about cooperating with others and in the ways by which they might govern IORs . Das and Teng (1996; 1998; have significantly expanded on and extended this argument. Chiles and McMackin (1996) extended the arguments in developing a somewhat different model of trust in which risk neutrality took center stage. Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) also proposed a model of trust in which the role of risk was central.
One of the ways that we saw risk and trust as distinct concepts dealt with the problems that parties who are contracting with each other face ex ante in assessing how to deal with foreseeable risks ex post. We argued that ex ante parties rely on trust and then assume that the other, ex post, will deal with gaps in their contracts fairly, explicitly raising the issues of distributive and procedural justice but not exploring them further. 8 In our 1992 SMJ article, we asserted that in addition to behavioral risk, IORs presented their managers with a variety of forms of risk: commercial, technological, engineering, and managerial. Building on Williamson (1993) and Ring (1996; 1997a; 1997b) , the role of behavioral risk has been extensively explored by Das and Teng (1996; 1998; who refer to it as relational risk and argue that it can be reduced by reliance on goodwill trust coupled with behavior and social control.
We also asserted that the degree of risk present in economic exchanges flowed from reductions in time, information and control. All three of these elements of risk have been explored. For example, Eriksson and Sharma (2003) explored the presence of risk in the decision making routines of the parties. These had significant direct impacts on buyer-supplier cooperation, and were, in turn, affected by risks associated with the contexts of exchange. Mosakowski and Earley (2000) undertook an extensive investigation of the role that time plays in a wide variety of organizational and interorganizational contexts. Hwang and Burgers (1999) also explored the role of time horizons in the context of IORs and demonstrated that trust and time jointly affect perceptions or risk. Brouthers and Brouthers (2003) found that differences in the entry modes employed by service and manufacturing firms in international contexts could be explained by the differing influences of risk and trust propensity.
Information-processing capabilities were found to enhance the ability of firms to assess partner trustworthiness, reducing the risk of misplaced trust (Carson, Madhok, Varman, and John 2003) . Dyer and Chu (2003) found that information sharing increases as perceptions of a partner's trustworthiness increases. Research by Ba and Pavlou (2002) demonstrated that reliance on trust mitigates information asymmetry by reducing transaction-specific risks. Sobrero and Schrader (1998) , in a meta analysis of 36 empirical studies, concluded that mutual information sharing was related to the ability of the parties to cooperate in R&D endeavors, the nature of which inherently involves various kinds of risk we described in our 1992 article.
Dekker (2004) discussed control problems and their interrelationships with informal (trust-based) mechanisms in buyer-supplier relationships. Barthelemy (2003) describes the loss of control over activities as one of the central concerns associated with the growing reliance on outsourcing. Gallivan and Depledge (2003) offer a framework that recognizes that "trust and control are not simple substitutes for each other. Rather, they form a dialectic, where it makes sense to consider each construct only in relationship to the other." Gallivan (2001) argued that social and self control, rather than reliance on trust, was more effective in enhancing performance in the virtual organizational context of open-systems software development. Das and Teng (1998; suggest a variety of ways in which control is related to risk and the roles that trust plays in governing IORs in which risk is present. Maguire, Phillips, and Hardy (2001) also argue that trust and control are closely related and make the case that the type of trust relied upon by parties may be a function of the potential loss of control they are attempting to forestall. In sum, each of the three antecedents of risk that we described in 1992 have been extensively researched and found to be associated with both risk and trust.
We assumed in our early work that parties to IORs would be trustworthy. Trustworthiness was reflected in open, other regarding behavior. Barney and Hansen (1994) made significant extensions to this argument in their SMJ article outlining three forms of trustworthiness, and others have extended the ways in which it is possible to think about perceptions of trustworthiness. Becerra and Gupta's (2003) findings support these conclusions and Weaver and Dickson (1998) demonstrate that among IORs involving SMEs, parties were more likely to assume trustworthiness than not. A failure to live up to contractual obligations or socially imposed norms would lead to negative views of the relationship, even when financial performance met or exceeded expectations.
As this literature review suggests, our views on trust continue to evolve. Scholars have defined and examined trust in terms of behavior, cognition, emotion, and faith. This coincides with the history of management thought, which can be viewed as a progressive quest to understand increasingly complex human and organizational phenomena.
Management theorizing in the 1950's and 1960's emphasized behavioralism, which was useful for explaining observable phenomena. For example, we can observe whether a person is trustworthy by observing whether the person cheats, steals, or lies. Fool me once, shame on you! Fool me twice, shame on me! The cognitive turn in the social sciences during the 1970's to 1980's was useful for explaining intentions, rational thinking (strategy) and sensemaking. For example, a person is trustworthy if his or her intentions are honorable, other-regarding, and fair. Behavioral and cognitive perspectives have their limits in explaining irrational or aberrant events and situations. As a result, in the 1990's scholars began to turn to emotion, affect and moods in people to explain irrational and impulsive psychotic behavior, such as envy, love, hate, and greed. How affect impacts trust broadens the study of trust development (Williams 2001) . But inexplicable phenomena remain. Some situations and events that occur in human and organizational relationships cannot be adequately explained on the basis of behavior, cognition, or emotion. Recently, some management scholars have begun to take their cue from religion to appreciate that in the final analysis humans rely on faith to reconcile inexplicable events that are beyond their control and to which they are vulnerable (Delbecq 1999) . As with the evolution of management theorizing, our understanding of trust as a multidimensional concept is evolving to incorporate behavioral, cognitive, emotional, and faith dimensions--each dimension addresses situations and events in relationships that cannot be explained by the other.
Empirical Assessments of Reliance on Trust in IORs
In our companion articles, we set forth a number of propositions dealing with the development of trust in IORs. In addition to institutional contexts, these included: the parties' past histories of cooperation (with each other and with other partners), the degree of risk associated with their economic exchanges, the observance of norms of fairness (measured in terms of procedural and distributive justice), a willingness to follow norms of equity, the degree of personal embeddedness among and between partners to IORs; and stability in organizational roles.
Further, we argued that reliance on trust by the parties would be a factor in their negotiations, in their ability to learn, and in their ability to reduce the costs of transactions and the cost of governing relationships. Reliance on trust would also lead to increased flows of information between individuals and their organizations, the reduction of uncertainty, agency costs and opportunity costs; which, in turn, reduced the levels of formal safeguards the parties employed in dealing with each other (which, we argued, leads to increased managerial flexibility). Similarly, we argued that an ability to rely on trust in economic exchanges would be related to the choices the parties made in their approaches to governing their relationships.
Finally, there was the question of the nature of a relationship between reliance on trust and IOR performance. In an indirect way we asserted a positive relationship between the ability to rely on trust and performance by proposing that it reduced the risk inherent in an exchange, all other things remaining equal . We also asserted that performance would be related to the processes that the parties employed in negotiating, committing to and executing phases of their IORs (Ring and Van de Ven 1994) . And in relating outcomes to trust, we argued in Ring and Van de Ven (1994) that over reliance on trust invited opportunistic behavior which, in turn, might be met by an escalation of tit-for-tat like responses involving increased reliance on formal safeguards that, ultimately, led to dissolution of IORs.
Since the publication of our papers, a significant amount of empirical researchers have examined and found empirical support for these relationships between trust and its antecedents and consequences. It is not our objective to exhaustively review the empirical literature (but see, for example, Zaheer and Harris 2004) . A few comments, however, on the overall findings from this research are in order.
With respect to the contexts surrounding reliance on trust, for example, Scheer, Kumar and Steenkamp (2003) found that relationships between inequity and trust varied across cultures. Stewart (2003) , building on the work of McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany (1998), added trust transfer to cognitive processes in demonstrating that intent to trust was a function of beliefs about trust. In their study of 615 Hong Kong firms with dealings in China, Child and Möllering (2003) provided empirical support for our arguments that institutional contexts have an impact on the willingness of parties to rely on trust. Similarly, Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1995) found that a high degree of institutional-based trust lowered levels of reliance on interpersonal trust.
To fully understand reliance on trust, Anderson, Hakansson, and Johanson (1994) asserted the need to focus on the embedded context of relationships. Trust is contextspecific (Lusch O'Brien, and Sindhav 2003; Vaara, Kleymann, and Seristo 2004) . Chen, Chen, and Meindl (1998) called for a culturally contingent model of cooperation. Rousseau et al. (1998) argued that reliance on trust is a matter of the culture of shared worlds; we trust persons who share our cultural values. Gulati (1995) offered support for our proposition that the nature of the parties' prior relationships would be associated with their willingness to rely on trust. Batt (2003) found that satisfaction with exchange built on trust in his study of growers and market agents in Australia. Bankers involved in forming syndicates were found to favor past partners when forming new alliances, not just for knowledge of partner's reliability and capabilities, but also because of inertia (Li and Rowley 2002) . Researchers have found that trust also has a number of indirect effects by enabling conditions--such as positive interpretations of another's behavior, procedural justice, and commitment--that are conducive to obtaining cooperation and higher performance (Dirks and Ferrin 2001) . In their study of 119 buyer-seller relations, Perrone, Zaheer, and McEvily (2003) demonstrated that trust is a function of role autonomy and discretion of agents.
Recently, the role that reliance on trust plays in the negotiations phase of IOR evolution has begun to be addressed. Naquin and Paulson (2003) , for example, found that on-line negotiations were characterized by lower levels of interpersonal trust than were face-to-face negotiations. Direct effects of trust on organizations engaged in negotiation processes were observed by Dirks and Ferrin (2001) . Ariño and Ring (2004) studied the role of trust and its associations with fairness in the context of a failed IJV negotiation. The direct effects that reliance on trust has on organizations include learning and knowledge sharing according to Dirks and Ferrin (2001) . Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter (2003) provide empirical evidence that relational capital (based on mutual trust and interaction at the individual level) between alliance partners creates a basis for learning and know-how transfer across the exchange interface.
A major focus of our two papers was the effect that trust would have on the cost of transacting and governing IORs. These views were dictated by a conscious decision to structure our arguments within the framework of an evolving theory of transaction costs economics that was having a significant impact on scholarship in the late 1980s and early 1990s (e.g., Williamson 1985; Kogut 1988; Hennart 1988 ). Although we were not the first to use the theory to explore issues related to trust and IOR dynamics, our 1992 Strategic Management Journal article, was, at the time, the most explicit propositional statement of the governance and transaction cost implications of reliance on trust.
In the intervening years, a substantial body of research has explored these issues. For example, Dyer and Chu (2003) demonstrated in their study of U.S., Korean and Japanese automakers that an ability to rely on trust reduced transactions costs. Artz and Brush (2000) provided support for the proposition that an ability to rely on relational norms helped to lower the costs of exchange in buyer-supplier relationships involving OEMs. Brouthers and Brouthers (2003) found that trust was more critical to a choice of entry mode in IORs in service than in manufacturing industries. Trust in a supplier predicted support for a merger (Lusch et al. 2003) . Carson et al. (2003) found that as the information processing capabilities of firms increased, so did their willingness to rely more on trust-based governance modes. Dyer and Chu (2003) in their study of U.S., Korean and Japanese automakers found that an ability to rely on trust was correlated with greater information sharing. In the Dirks and Ferrin (2001) study previously mentioned, the direct effects of trust on organizations included more open communication and knowledge sharing.
We also proposed that trust would be associated with conflict aversion. Experiments by Smithson (1999) demonstrate that conflicting sources of information generally are perceived as being less credible than those that derive from ambiguous sources. Conflict raises suspicions about whether sources of information are trustworthy or credible. If the sources disagree, then the judge is not only uncertain but must also disagree with at least one of the sources. Dirks and Ferrin (2001) also found that an ability to rely on trust produced creative conflict management approaches. Burt and Knez (1995) demonstrated the importance of "third-party gossip" in understanding when people rely on trust in network contexts. Deeds and Hill (1999) found that healthy relationships (which Ariño, de la Torre, and Ring (2001) described as partners enjoying high levels of relational quality) were more effective in reducing opportunism than reliance on hostages or elaborate contingent claims contracts. Parkhe (1993) provided support for our proposition about the relationship between a willingness to rely on trust and a reduction in reliance on formal safeguards. We also argued that the direct effects of trust on organizations include greater flexibility; this was supported in the finding of Dirks and Ferrin (2001) . Young, Sapienza, and Baumer (2003) also found that trust promotes flexibility in IORs, and flexibility increases productivity of entrepreneurial software companies (see also Young-Ybarra and Wiersema 1999).
In our arguments about relying on trust in IORs, we made no specific predictions about performance related outcomes. Nonetheless, a sizable body of subsequent research has produced mixed findings on this issue. For example, the failure of the Sport7 JV, a fledging Dutch TV station, was linked to the entry of a new, less trusted actor in the business network (Sminia 2003) . Trust is found to be one of several success factors for manufacturing networks (Scherer, 2003) , prenatal IOR services in Quebec (D'Amour Goulet, Labadie, Bernier, and Pineault 2003), children's mental health services (Rivard and Morrissey 2003) , and supplier responsiveness in supply chain relationships (Handfield and Bechtel 2002) . Trust also mediated communication/knowledge and technological outcomes in industry-university IORs (Santoro and Saparito 2003) . Socially oriented trust was found to mediate relationships between client satisfaction and a variety of vendor characteristics in a study of 157 firms by Gainey and Klaas (2003) .
In addition, several studies found trust to be unrelated to various indicators of IOR performance. In a study of 700 Sino-foreign JVs, asymmetric vs. symmetric governance structures were not significantly related to profitability (Lee, Chen, and Kao 2003) . So also, in a study of 53 collaborations in physics and sciences, trust was unrelated to performance (Shrum, Chompalov, and Genuth 2001) . In another study, the use of IT support for IOR knowledge management was explained by firm (and knowledge) cooperation between Norwegian and Australian law firms while IOR trust was not a significant predictor (Gottschalk and Khandelwal 2002) . And in a study of 164 small firm alliances in Australia, trust was found to be important but not sufficient for alliance success; also important were strategic compatibility and appropriate governance structure (Hoffmann and Schlosser 2001) .
Finally, several of our propositions have not been rigorously tested. For example, very little work has been done exploring the kinds of risk (other than behavioral risk) that frequently are associated with the kinds of economic exchanges conducted within IORs and how the negative impacts of these different sources of risk can be mediated when transacting parties are able to rely on trust. In our view, the impact of personal embeddedness on both the evolution of reliance on trust at an interpersonal level, or on perceptions of trustworthiness, remains under explored. In short, there still are important gaps in a growing body of empirical work exploring relationships between reliance on trust and its antecedents and consequences.
The Process of Trust Development
In our original arguments we generally focused on interpersonal trust, and we argued that in IORs reliance on trust takes place between individuals. In discussing the confidence that an economic actor has "in the goodwill of others not to cause harm when you are vulnerable to them. . . ." at the organization level of analysis we rely, not on trust, but on other concepts. Depending upon the specific context, they include relational quality (e.g., Ariño et al. 2001) , reputation (Ferguson and Deephouse 2000) , and legitimacy (Olk and Ring 1997) .
Rather than making assumptions about what transpires at an organizational level in decisions related to governance modes or contractual safeguards, however, we believe that the time has come to begin rigorous empirical testing of the following questions. Do executives, managers, and employees actually trust the actions of organizations? Do they rely on that trust as substitutes for or complements to more formalized and elaborated forms of governance (e.g., equity joint ventures, elaborated levels of safeguards in written contracts)?
Or, do they rely on other concepts such as reputation or legitimacy when dealing with organizations.
We also encourage more empirical testing of the extent to which variance in governance modes, transactions costs, etc. is more or less explained by the distinct (or interactive) contributions of reliance on trust (interpersonal or inter-organizational), reputation, legitimacy, or relational quality.
In our 1994 Academy of Management Review article, we offered a process model of the evolution of IORs, along with a set of propositions that describe the manner in which reliance on interpersonal trust might evolve over time. We argued that interpersonal trust building is a developmental process: "It requires careful and systematic attention to the concrete processes by which personal relationships emerge between transacting parties" (Ring and Van de Ven 1994, p. 93) .
Consistent with this argument, many studies have further explored how trust is created, learned and experienced. These studies have demonstrated that reliance on trust involves extensive investment, is reciprocal, and constantly evolving. Ariño and de la Torre (1998) provided detailed insight into processes that led Coke and Nestle to terminate their alliance, in part because each saw their behavior as being inequitable and opportunistic. Doz (1996) developed a model of IOR evolution in which learning played a central role, and his model provides a basis for thinking about how parties to economic exchanges can learn to rely on trust in dealing with each other. Kumar and Nti (1998) found that the ways partners assess and react to outcome discrepancies shapes the developmental path of an IOR, and by implication the extent to which the parties will rely on trust in dealing with each other. Dyer and Singh (1998) and Hansen, Hoskisson, Lorenzoni, and Ring (1997; extended these arguments in a more dynamic way by describing the kinds of capabilities firms would need to manage trust-based relational contracting processes. Ariño, de la Torre, Doz, Lorenzoni, and Ring (2002) provide an extensive discussion of the evolutionary dynamics of IORs, including issues related to the emergence of reliance on interpersonal trust. While stable relationships maintain equilibrium over time, divergence can lead to termination of the JV (Buchel 2002) . Bell, Oppenheimer, and Bastien (2002) , for example, have found that violations of ability, integrity, and benevolence all contributed to trust reduction and early violations of trustee benevolence sensitized parties and contributed importantly to trust deterioration.
With the exception of the studies just reviewed, virtually all of the research on trust in IORs is based on cross sectional studies that do not provide information about the temporal development of trust. We have very little empirical evidence about the evolutionary dynamics of interpersonal trust. Longitudinal research is required to observe how and why processes of trust develop over time. It is important that scholars begin to undertake longitudinal process studies if we are to provide managers with evidence-based models and principles for managing IORs to achieve their business and community level strategies. Poole, provide detailed and useful methods for conducting such longitudinal process studies.
Changing Contexts and Assumptions of Trust-Based Relationships
Thus far we have discussed scholarly advances to understanding the antecedents, consequences, and developmental processes of trust in IORs. As was the case in our assumptions about the role of culture and institutions that lead people to be willing to rely on trust when managing and governing IORs. Three social and economic trends are making these assumptions explicit and are calling them into question. First, with the growth of relational contracting, outsourcing, strategic alliances, and networks, trustbased relationships are increasingly becoming the organizing principle for doing business . Second, despite the immense appeal and importance of trust, there is extensive evidence that trust is declining in many societies and organizations (see, e.g., Bruhn 2001; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1997. But, see also Fukuyama 1995; Putnam 2002) . Third, in an increasingly global economy the parties engaged in many business relationships are from cultures that rely on different bases of personal and institutional trust (Friedberg 2000; Pearce 2001 ). These trends represent significant challenges, as well as opportunities, for advancing our understanding of the roles that reliance on trust can play in the governance and management of economic exchanges.
The growth of IORs among organizations from different countries and cultures requires reexamination of the assumption that institutions provide recourse for parties to settle their disputes when violations of interpersonal trust occur. When parties cannot resolve differences through private ordering (using their own devices), those of us accustomed to the everyday presence of institutional guarantors (Commons 1950) naturally assume that all parties can resort to these kinds of institutions for the public resolution of disputes. This may be a valid assumption if the public institutions governing disputes between the parties to an IOR are judged to be trustworthy, legitimate, and reliable. Pearce (2001) reports that under nonfacilitative governments (those with weak, unpredictable, or hostile institutions, like China, and former communist countries in Europe), business managers have to depend more heavily on their personal relationships in order to obtain protection from threats that are more completely secured by facilitative governments (with strong institutions). She points out that "although this reliance on personal relationships has been called trust-based authority, these relationships are not necessarily characterized by the warmth and supportiveness usually associated with that word. Rather, this is organizing based on mutual personal dependency rather than trusting relationships" (Pearce 2001, p. 54) . Humphrey and Schmitz (1998) provide additional support for Pearce's observations in their assessment of the roles played by trust in inter-firm relationships in the developing economies of the old Soviet Union.
Our focus on public ordering and the institutions that economic actors employ in its use in this chapter unduly narrows the range of institutions that can be employed in lieu of private ordering. We recognize that this is the case, as we did in our original articles. The fact remains, however, that other institutions can be relied upon by economic actors and are in fact used quite frequently. The role that trust plays in these contexts is well researched (see, e.g., Lane and Bachmann 1998; Biggart and Delbridge 2004; Ring 2004) , but a more complete discussion of it is beyond the objectives of this chapter.
In our 1994 paper we proposed that "the greater the transaction-specific investments made under conditions of uncertainty, the more the immediate parties stand to benefit from preserving the relationship" (Ring and Van de Ven 1994, p. 95) . The internal resolution of disputes within an ongoing "agreement" is often in the best interest of the parties involved. If parties resort to external institutional safeguards to resolve their disputes, the typical result will be the dissolution of the agreement being disputed, and, perhaps, of their on-going business relationships. We also noted that over-reliance on interpersonal trust could also lead to an abuse of trust and that over-reliance on public ordering could produce similar results, citing the work of Granovetter (1985) and Shapiro (1987) .
Underlying the caveats just noted was our assumption that human beings and their institutions are fallible. As we have observed, interpersonal trust is often easier to breach than it is to build. No organizational relationship is perfect, and most current business relationships are not expendable. As a result, seldom can parties terminate an organizational relationship in the event of a breach in interpersonal trust. But, this raises one of the more interesting paradoxes of organizational relationships: they continue in the face of breaches of interpersonal trust. Our review of the literature reveals that too little attention appears to have been paid to forgiveness, repair, and reconstruction of trust in relationships that have experienced a breach in trust among the parties.
The Decline of Trust.
Ironically, and unfortunately, while the need to rely on trust and the benefits that flow from this are clear, there is extensive evidence that trust is declining in many (but not all) societies and within many organizations. Bruhn (2001, p. 3) describes the many polls and studies showing that trust and its allies--honesty, integrity, and commitment--have been declining in the United States as well as in other countries over the past 50 years. notes a similar decline.
Others provide evidence that this is the case in the United States. For example, a national survey conducted in 1995 by the Washington Post, Harvard University and the Kaiser Family Foundation, found that America is becoming a nation of suspicious strangers, and it is this mistrust of each other that is a major reason Americans have lost confidence in the federal government and virtually every other major institution--health professions, corporate business, education, churches, and Wall Street (Brossard 1996) .
Each succeeding generation that has come of age since the 1950's has been more distrusting of human nature. Today, nearly two in three Americans believe that most people can not be trusted; one-half say most people would cheat others if they had a chance, and that most people are looking out for themselves (Bruhn 2001) .
Numerous reasons for the decline of trust have been offered. Watergate, the Berkeley and Watts riots, the Vietnam War, social and technical change, new configurations of the traditional family, along with generational differences have been described as loosening the social fabric of society resulting in less caring, decreased social support and connectedness, decreased participation as citizens, and therefore, less social capital and trust (See, e.g., Fukuyama 1995) . These surveys predate the more recent corporate Enron-like scandals, sexual abuse in the Catholic Church, 9/11, terrorism, the War in Iraq, AIDS, SARS and the Avian Flu epidemics, etc. Bruhn (2001, p. 35 ) also observes that: "Changes in the work environment over the past 2-3 decades have significantly altered how we trust organizations, our bosses and coworkers. In the past there was such a thing as lifetime employment. Corporations assumed responsibility for career development, and employees believed that their employer would act in their best interests. Having experienced massive restructurings, mergers, layoffs, outsourcing, growing wage disparities between executives and workers, excessive greed, employment has become more transactional, and employees know they are expendable."
These conditions appear to have significantly altered the landscape in which IORs emerged and evolved over the past two decades. If, as we argued, context is critical to understanding reliance on trust, what are the implications of these changes for IORs and those who manage them? And, how have firms managed to cooperate with each other when their employees have increasingly been less trustful of the firms that employ them?
Let us start by defining what we perceive as the context in which many IORs will take place in the next decade. First, many more people will be perceived as less trustworthy and the willingness of those with whom they do business to rely on interpersonal trust will be less evident. For example, as the world's economy becomes more global, those societies in which "insiders" are perceived as being more trustworthy than "outsiders" will discover that they are dealing with more "outsiders." Similarly, in economies in which familial ties were the basis for trust are likely to experience a reduced ability to rely on kinship ties. 9 Second, and as a consequence, IORs will experience more breaches of interpersonal trust. These breaches may not necessarily occur as a consequence of malfeasance. In fact, the breaches of trust may be inadvertent--a result of a lack of awareness that "normal" behaviors are perceived as reflecting a lack of trust in "business" relations when in fact they may have been intended to reflect a lack of trust in a social sense. Third, managers who, ordinarily, would respond by relying more on institutional sources of trust will have less confidence in those sources of trust. Or, as both and Putnam (2002) argue, managers will discover that they have less social capital to rely on in dealing with economic matters. In short, managers of IORs will find themselves in "Catch-22" situations.
What might be done about this decline in trust when we need it the most? Management scholars offer three basic approaches: (1) do nothing, (2) work to improve institutional governance structures to deal more effectively with those who would abuse trust and act opportunistically, and (3) take steps to repair and reconstruct trust within ongoing interpersonal relationships.
The first option is to do nothing and accept the trends and situations as they are, even though they have become deplorable. There are, of course, grave consequences of doing nothing. According to Bruhn (2001, p. 33 ), "At the individual level, a person who follows a life of distrust will find that his/her world is constantly narrowing. Usually chronically distrustful persons become cynical and depressed, and their behavior alienates them from others, leading to further social isolation." Organizations and societies made up of substantial numbers of individuals acting on such a belief system will become increasingly dysfunctional. Thus, doing nothing is unacceptable and as such unlikely. The threat of allowing this first option to take hold across a broad spectrum of civil life is undoubtedly a factor in the rise of concern for the role that social capital plays in everyday economic and political (as well as social) life (see, e.g., Coleman 1988; Fukayama 1995; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Putnam 2002) A second option is the design of institutions that are the legal structures and safeguards to provide support for parties that try to rely on trust, but find that those with whom they are dealing do not reciprocate. This requires re-examining a wide variety of institutional practices and policies.
For example, consider the consequences of just one contributing factor of increasing distrust--corporate layoffs. Wanberg, Glomb, Song, and Sorenson (2004) report that there were 8,349 mass layoffs in 2001 in the U.S., which led to 1.7 million individuals losing their jobs. Numerous psychological studies have documented the negative impact of job-loss on the physical, mental, and social functioning of unemployed workers and their family members (Leana and Feldman 1992) . For example, studies demonstrate that job loss is associated with increased anxiety, depression, sleeping problems, alcohol disorders, divorce, and child abuse (e.g., Dooley, Fielding, and Levi 1996) . Research suggests that job loss has a negative influence on every indicator of mental and physical health (e.g., Dooley, Fielding, and Levi 1996; Leana and Feldman 1992) . And those that remain employed evidence even less trust in the organizations that have laid-off their friends and colleagues. There was a time when this phenomenon occurred almost exclusively within the United States. But, in a global economy in which firms in labor intensive industries increasingly have to move manufacturing to lower labor cost economies, "layoffs" are visited on workers in countries in which life time employment within a single firm was assumed to be beyond the reach of the effects of globalization. 10 This research raises a significant policy issue. Many years ago Reinhard Bendix (1956) pointed out that the history of business has been to "internalize benefits and externalize costs." To what degree should companies be allowed to externalize their human cost on individuals and society? Clean air, water, and OSHA laws have been established to curb pollution of our physical environment. Although we do not have the data, our guess is that costs of corporate abuses of human resources wrought onto society far exceed the costs of those on our physical environment. These costs call attention to the need for an important policy debate on the design of institutions and laws that curb corporate abuses of degrading our human resources and their resulting pain and health care costs on former employees and society.
Legal systems and the institutional safeguards they provide are clearly needed to protect, enable, and constrain behaviors that society values as fair and trustworthy. Ring (2004) offers a series of steps that could be taken by states to increase reliance on trust and reduce the costs of economic exchange in general. Among them are: reducing systemic governmental corruption, aggressively prosecuting individuals who abuse their public offices thereby increasing confidence in institutional guarantors, increasing the level of robust competition within an economy thereby providing economic actors with options to parties that cannot be trusted, increasing the amount of information available to economic actors and reducing information asymmetry thereby reducing opportunities to benefits from opportunistic behavior, increasing requirements to bargain in good faith and providing remedies in the case of breach thereby increasing the incentives for parties to rely more heavily on interpersonal trust in ex ante stages of contract, making public more information on economic actors who are persistently opportunistic thereby making it easier for individuals and organizations to avoid doing business with them, adequately supporting systems of justice when the stakes are high, dampening the benefits of opportunistic behavior while complementing, but not supplanting, social sanctions that already may be effective 11 In the final analysis, however, these kinds of interventions will never substitute for high commitment interpersonal relations (Helper and Levin 1992) . This brings us to our third option: repair and reconstruct trust within ongoing interpersonal relationships. As stated before, human beings and their institutions are fallible. No relationship is perfect, and most relationships are not expendable. With their "backs against the wall," reasonable people often can and will work out their differences and failings. Even after serious violations, it is possible to reconstruct trust in relationships. Reconstruction can occur when the parties involved believe the relationship is worth salvaging, so they engage in a negotiation process that involves an extended period of time where they assess the violation and the intent of the violator, and they offer an apology and render forgiveness.
The daughter of trust is forgiveness. The study of repair, forgiveness, and reconstruction of relationships should be a high priority of organization and management scholars. Bruhn (2001, p. 30 ) discusses the act of forgiveness. "Even though it may not be accepted by the other party, forgiveness always makes a difference to the forgiving individual and creates a permanent difference in the relationship, which over time, can lead to full conflict resolution and restoration of the relationship. Healing begins with forgiveness (Schneiderman 1999) . Authentic forgiveness includes the following characteristics:
it is unconditional; it is offered to the other person regardless of the response; it is self-regarding as well as altruistic; forgiveness is offered for the wellbeing of the relationship and requires that the persons break free of old habits and feelings; it does not take place instantaneously; and it is not symmetrical; one party usually instigates the process and becomes the prime mover in restoring the relationship.
Schneiderman notes that if forgiveness is to be an effective intervention, full conflict resolution is necessary. Forgiveness is a transforming process that empowers the forgiver and forgivee (Kurzynski 1998) .
We closed our 1994 Academy of Management Review article by observing that: "as the uncertainty, complexity, and duration of economic transactions within and between firms increase, it becomes increasingly important for scholars and managers to understand developmental processes of how equity, trust, conflict resolution procedures, and internal governance structures emerge and dissolve over time" (1994, p. 113, emphasis added) . We believe that developing this understanding is even more critical today than it was ten years ago.
